In establishing the diagnosis of brain death, physicians with varying knowledge about central nervous system function and pathology are called upon to treat vigorously in an effort to forestall death, sometimes also to preserve life, and to tread lightly around family, nurses, lawyers, and, most of all, District Attorneys. New concepts evolve about how the brain dies almost as rapidly as technology advances. The physician is left holding the bag which in this situation means having to decide whether or not a brain has died while the brain's heart pumps on and the lungs respire or are made to do so by more of our technology.
The physician finds he is asked not if someone died, but if that someone has experienced brain death, cerebral death, brainstem death, or maybe even some combination of these choices. To protect himself from charges of malpractice, not to mention manslaughter or murder, the physician may initially elect to treat the patient vigorously while treading lightly in disclosing prognosis. But then what does the physician-in-charge, the patient's own Attending Physician, do for an encore after the first few days of technological magic, initial grim technical success, and dismal stabilization of a patient who is not expected to live, but who is also not expected to die to the satisfaction of our technology until untoward expenditure of physician and nursing time, hospital care, and massive infusions of money have occurred?
By now we know that attempts to codify or establish a cookbook formula for the diagnosis of brain, cerebral, or brainstem death are fraught with danger, more for the physician than for the patient. Criteria about brain death vary widely, yet all may be valid. In the same patient, different conclusions may be drawn by applying different sets of criteria.
In some criteria the EEG is emphasized while in others it is not relied upon at all. Some authors point out that cerebral blood flow may stop even before the vast vestiges of EEG activity have ceased. Others emphasize the use of evoked potentials. Within the microcosm of evoked potential debate, some suggest that somatosensory evoked potentials are more resistant to ischemia than auditory evoked potentials and therefore are more reliable than the auditory response in the determination of brain death. The so-called "flat" or isoelectric EEG reportedly signifying brain death has now been joined by other technologies capable of identifying the dearth of function of an organ (read brain in this context) which some equate with the death of that organ. But none of these technologies has replaced the ability of the physician at the bedside to make a final decision. However, all of these technological supports have served to render the making of a decision more complicated.
The plea of the physician who comes to the patient's bedside, who has to face his patient's family and friends, who would prefer not to face homicide or malpractice charges later, has not quite been forgotten although he has had to plead for attention in progressively less dulcet tones. Especially difficult situations occur when a proposed organ-recipient is waiting for a donor-organ wherein the proposed recipient is running out of time and life. In this situation, pressure may be applied to Attending Physicians and to electroencephalographers to hasten their determination that a given patient has indeed succumbed to brain death and may now donate a vital organ.
To prevent this scenario I have included the following comments in my own policy statement on this topic. It is offered here for more general use where it may be felt to be applicable. The chief benefit of this statement is that it removes the consultant or Attending Physician, or the interpretor of a study, EEG, evoked potential, or other, from the awkward position of finding himself expected to become the arbiter or umpire of brain death. This statement as policy restores the primary physician to his primary role in the care of the sick patient. v The EEG laboratory does not exist for the comfort and benefit of the proposed recipient of a donated organ. There is nothing "stat" about an EEG from the donor's point of view. It is the donor, not the recipient, that the EEG laboratory is serving. The recipient may be in a hurry; the donor is not.
Proper priorities require us to put the patient for whom a diagnostic service is ©1984 VOL. 15 NO.1 rendered before the needs of a proposed recipient. Any other role could create an untenable situation wherein a diagnostic laboratory might exist more for the proposed recipient than for the actual patient for whom the EEG is done. This scenario would constitute a conflict of interest which need not occur if we remember that we are serving patients rather than procedures. 
